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ABSTRACT
We present a crowdsourcing system that extends the capabilities
of location-based applications and allows users to connect and
exchange information with users in spatial and temporal proximity.
We define this incident of spatio-temporal proximity as a close
encounter. Typically, location-based application users store their
information on a server, and trust the server to provide access only
to authorized users, not misuse the data or disclose their location
history. Our system, called SPICE, addresses these privacy issues
by leveraging Wi-Fi access points to connect users and encrypt
their information before it is exchanged, so only users in close
encounters have access to the information. We present the design
of the system and describe the challenges in implementing the
protocol in a real-world application.

CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Network privacy and anonymity; Mobile and
wireless security; • Human-centered computing → Smartphones;
Social content sharing; • Information systems → Location based
services; Crowdsourcing;
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INTRODUCTION

A subset of location-based crowd-sensing applications allow colocated users to contact each other at events [23], or to handle
emergency situations [8]. In this paper, we propose a system that
allows users to connect not only with co-located users, but also
users in spatial and temporal proximity. We define this incident of
spatio-temporal proximity as a close encounter.
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Two devices are in spatio-temporal proximity of each other if
they were (i) at the same location almost at the same time, (ii) almost at the same location at the same time, or (iii) almost at the
same location at almost the same time. By supporting close encounters, location-based applications can allow users to share and
collect information such as images and videos [7] or sensor data [4]
from others who were in spatio-temporal proximity. For example,
obtaining additional images and videos about a situation from others who were in spatial and temporal proximity can be useful to
Alzhemier’s patients, event attendees, tourists, forensic investigators, and emergency responders. Spatial and temporal ranges for
sharing are application-specific, but we expect “near” (spatial range)
to be about 10-50 meters and “close” (temporal range) to be not
more than 30 minutes.
Since the users in spatio-temporal proximity may never encounter each other, the naive way for them to share information
would be to upload it to a server and allow others to download
the information retrospectively from the server. Incorporating a
server in the system poses the following challenges: 1) a curious
server operator may learn the location histories of the users who
upload and download the information, as well as the information
itself, and 2) any user, irrespective of their location, may be able to
access the information. Prior research, however, has shown that
users may be comfortable sharing information only if they see a
value in sharing [15], so a user may be concerned if others, who
were not in a close encounter with her, for whom the information
maybe irrelevant, may be able to access the information, especially
if the information was sensitive, such as photos or videos.
To address these challenges, we propose a system called SPICE
(Secure Proximity-based Infrastructure for Close Encounters) that
leverages existing Wi-Fi access points to connect users and encrypt
their information before it is uploaded to the servers. Only users
in spatio-temporal proximity to the uploading user will be able to
decrypt and download the information.
Even though every SPICE application will have its own protocol,
the underlying framework remains the same. For example, the
protocol may differ depending on the type of information that is
collected and shared, i.e., an application where a user collects and
shares videos and photographs may need to use a protocol different
from an application where a user sends information as text. The
protocol may also differ in terms of consent management if the
photos and videos were taken on the uploading user’s smartphone
as opposed to being captured by a surveillance camera mounted
on a building. In this paper, we present a generic technological
framework that allows users to share and receive any information
given their spatio-temporal proximity to each other in a secure
manner.
Although the broader effects of this idea will need further study via
experimental deployment, this paper focuses on the technological
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foundations of sharing information in close encounters. We make
four contributions:
• We present the design of a smartphone-based system called
SPICE (Secure Proximity-based Infrastructure for Close Encounters) to share information in close encounters, while
providing strong privacy properties.
• We describe protocols for the SPICE architecture that allows
information exchange among users who were in spatial and
temporal proximity.
• We further extend the protocol to reduce the risk of unauthorized access to the information and disclosure of users’
location history.
• We consider the challenges of a real-world deployment of the
SPICE protocol and suggest ways to handle the challenges.
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can link it to other information provided by the same helper, earlier
or later.
P3. Confidentiality. Only users who shared a close encounter with
the helper can receive information collected by the helper from
the source. Also the server does not learn about the users’ location
history.
We are concerned about the following threats:
T1. Threat to privacy: An adversary may link a user to a certain
location, link one user to multiple locations, link multiple users at
the same location, assemble a complete location history of a user,
or identify a user.
T2. Threat of confidentiality: A malicious user may try to obtain
data collected at locations they never visited.
SPICE has the following trust model.
TR1. Proper key generation. The users trust the wireless broadcasting devices to generate keys according to the SPICE protocol and
not to share keys otherwise.
TR2. Proper message routing. The queriers trust the server to forward their messages to the helpers and the helpers trust the server
to forward messages to the queriers.
TR3. Trustworthy app. Users trust the SPICE app not to disclose
their location history except via the SPICE protocol. Similarly
helpers trust the app to not disclose the information they collect
except to relevant queriers, and queriers trust the app to send their
queries only to the server.
TR4. Trustworthy sources. SPICE relies on the sources to determine
whether the data they share with users is accurate and to alert
the user or administrator managing the sources when error or
malfunction is detected.
We expect all access points, smartphones, and sources have sufficient processing power and storage capabilities to support cryptographic primitives. We assume a malicious user cannot install
malware on smartphones to collect keys from all users. A user who
visits different locations to collect keys is not considered an adversary and can obtain information if they were in spatio-temporal
proximity with a helper at those locations, even if their reason for
collecting the keys was malicious. We expect a malicious user may
be able to collect some, but not all the keys received by all other
users, simply by visiting the locations. We assume users will not
share keys with other users.

THE SPICE SYSTEM

The SPICE system comprises five main components: users, sources,
smartphones, broadcasting devices, and servers.
Users. People who have smartphones with wireless capabilities
to connect to the Internet and to nearby sources. Although
we refer to a user who queries information as a querier q
and a user who shares the information as a helper h, over
time a given user may be both a querier and a helper. The
SPICE system expects that the user carries her smartphone
(or tablet) with her at (nearly) all times.
Sources. The helper uses a sensor or a device, i.e., a source s, to
capture information. The SPICE system assumes that a user’s
smartphone is already paired with the sources; the device
pairing step is out of scope. For example, photos can be obtained from sources such as smartphone cameras (internal
to the smartphone), personal cameras (external to smartphone but with the helper), drones (controlled remotely by
the helper), or surveillance cameras mounted on buildings
(immovable and not controlled by anyone, but helper can
pair with it to obtain photographs).
Smartphones. A user’s smartphone stores information collected
from sources.
Broadcasting devices. A broadcasting device distributes cryptographic keys to SPICE users in its vicinity. The keys are used
to encrypt the information. In this paper, we consider Wi-Fi
access points for the role of broadcasting devices.
Server. The server forwards information from helper to the querier.
We expect helpers will choose an expiration period for data they
upload. By default, all data stored on the server has an expiration
period of one month.
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(1)

2.1

Security Model

We understand that helpers and queriers will have privacy concerns when using SPICE to share and query context. SPICE has the
following privacy goals:
P1. Anonymity. A matched querier and helper cannot learn each
others’ identity. The server operator also cannot learn the identity
of the querier and helper.
P2. Unlinkability. When a querier’s smartphone receives information from a helper, neither the querier’s smartphone nor the querier

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

DESIGN

We describe the SPICE protocol in three different stages for the
purpose of exposition. The terms used in the protocol are defined
in Table 1. The protocol has six steps, as described below.
Location tracking: Users obtain location information continuously
from Wi-Fi access points; the location information is obtained from
beacon frames that are available to all clients in the vicinity of
access points and not just the clients that are associated with it.
Information collection: Helpers obtain information from source.
Information upload: Helpers upload information to the server.
Query: Queriers send queries to the server to obtain information.
Consent (optional): The server may send a request to the helper for
obtaining consent to share information.
Information download: The querier obtains the requested information from the server.

SPICE: Secure Proximity-based Infrastructure for Close Encounters
Notation
u
s
h
q
L
t
T
R(u, T )
B
b
S
I, I ′
H (X )
E(k, X )
D(k, X )

Description
User
Source
Helper
Querier
Location
Timestamp
Time range
Set of locations visited by u during time range T
Broadcasting device
Broadcasting interval
SPICE server
Information
Message digest of X
Encrypt X using key k
Decrypt X using key k

Table 1: Notations used in the SPICE system model. The type
of encryption performed by E() and D() is implicitly symmetric.

Naive version. First, we describe how the protocol allows users
to obtain information from other users. For now, we focus on close
encounters where both helpers and queriers were at the same location.
Location tracking: The users’ smartphones obtain location information from GPS/Wi-Fi access points, i.e., the broadcasting
devices.
B ⇒ u : L, t
Information collection: The helpers obtain information from sources.
s ⇒h :I
Information upload: The helpers upload information tagged with
location L, timestamp t to the server S. The server stores the
L, t as index along with the information I .
h ⇒ S : L, t, I
Query: Queriers can search for information using a set of search
filters, which may include location and a time range.
q ⇒ S : {L,T }
Information download: The naive version does not require any
consent from the helper. The server retrieves all the information I from the queried location, within the time range T
specified in the query and sends the set of all the retrieved
information to the querier.
S ⇒ q : {I | ∃t ∈ T , (L, t, I ) ∈ S }
In this version, the information is never encrypted, so the users
have to trust the server operator to not misuse the data, or disclose
the helpers’ location history. By routing the communication via the
server, the helper and querier never learn each other’s identity.
Encrypted version with untrustworthy server. Next, we update the
protocol so the helper can encrypt the information before uploading
it to the server, so the information cannot be accessed by the server
operator. However, the system should allow any querier who shared
a close encounter with the helper to access the information, i.e.,
decrypt the information that was encrypted by the helper. Since
the helper and querier shared a close encounter, they were at the
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same location and so the information can be encrypted using the
location where the information was collected. The first two steps
remain the same as the naive version.
Information upload: After obtaining the information, the helper
encrypts the information using a key computed from an
abstract representation of location (obtained by applying
a hash function to the location value), and uploads the encrypted information to the server, with the time (in clear
text) when the information was taken. The server stores the
time as the index of the encrypted information.
h ⇒ S : t, E(H (L), I )
Query: The querier searches for information using a time range
T . The queriers do not need to send any location, since the
keys effectively abstract their location.
q ⇒S :T
Information download: The server retrieves all encrypted information that contained timestamps included in the time range
requested by the querier. The querier attempts to decrypt the
encrypted information I ′ after retrieving all the locations it
visited during the time range T . For those I ′ records where
the querier was at the same location L as the helper, she can
decrypt the information.
S ⇒ q : {I ′ | ∃t ∈ T , (t, I ′ ) ∈ S }
h : I = D(H (L), I ′ ), ∀L ∈ R(u,T )
In this version, the users need not trust the server operator with
the information. The location is never sent in clear text to the
server, so the server operator also cannot trace the helper’s or
querier’s location history. But the keys are location values, and
hence reproducible; so any user who can guess L will be able to
decrypt any information, against the expectation of the helpers.
Encrypted version with malicious users. Finally, we update the
protocol to prevent a malicious or curious user from obtaining
unauthorized access to information. For this purpose, the keys
should be dynamic and reproducible only by someone who visited
the same location as the helper at about the same time. SPICE uses
forward and backward hash chains to create cryptographic keys
that are used for encrypting and decrypting the information, as
described below. As additional protection, the server never stores
any information; the server forwards any query from queriers to all
helpers, so the helpers can give consent before sharing information
with the queriers.
The broadcasting devices running the SPICE protocol will broadcast cryptographic keys to all the smartphones (running the SPICE
application) in their vicinity, ensuring that any two users at the
same location will receive (and can recreate) numbers from the
same hash chain. A forward hash chain works as follows. Suppose
at time t, broadcasting device B sends key k. At time t +b, where the
broadcasting interval is b minutes, the broadcasting device sends
key H (k), where H is a hash function. At time t + nb, B sends key
H n (k). A backward hash chain, on the other hand, pre-computes
a different chain of keys and sends them in reverse, as follows. At
time t, B sends H n (k ′ ), at time t +b, B sends H (n−1) (k ′ ) and at time
t + nb, B sends k ′ .
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Suppose helper h, and queriers q and q ′ , visit location L but never
see each other. A querier q who arrived at L before h and leaves at t
receives keys k, H n (k ′ ). Helper h arrives at location L at time t + b
and receives keys H (k), H (n−1) (k ′ ); h leaves before t + nb. At time
t +nb, querier q ′ receives H n (k), k ′ . All users store the keys in their
smartphones and the keys are not used until a querier requests
information. A querier requests the server for any information the
system has for a certain time range.
Suppose we were to modify the protocol so that the server stores
encrypted information, but in this case, what keys should the helper
use to encrypt the information before sending it to the server? The
helper only learns the time range for which to generate keys from
the query; so in the protocol, the helper never encrypts or sends
information to the server, until a query for information arrives.
When a server receives a query, the server simply relays this query
to all users other than the querier. Alternatively, we could also
limit the number of users the server has to forward the query
to by having helpers upload the timestamps, to denote when they
collected information, which allows the server to choose the helpers
to forward the query to. However, we choose privacy over efficiency
and to limit the knowledge the server has about users, the helper
does not upload any information to the server until a querier sends
a query.
Once h receives a query, which contains a time range, she will
generate keys that she expects the querier would have received
for the time range and encrypts the information with those keys.
If the query contains (t − nb . . . t), the helper computes the key
using the backward hash function H and encrypts the information
with H n (k ′ ). If the query contains (t . . . t + nb), the helper computes the key using the forward hash function H and encrypts
the information with all the following keys, H (k), H 2 (k), . . . H n (k).
If q requests (t − nb . . . t + nb), h will encrypt I using each of
H n (k ′ ), H (k), H 2 (k), . . . H n (k) as cryptographic keys.
For simplicity, we assume a user only receives keys from one
broadcasting device; we discuss multiple broadcasting devices later.
Location tracking: The users obtain cryptographic keys that represent their location from broadcasting devices, such as Wi-Fi
access points. At time t, in the above example,
B ⇒ q : k, H n (k ′ )
At time t + b,
B ⇒ h : H (k), H n−1 (k ′ )
At time t + nb,
B ⇒ q ′ : H n (k), k ′
There is no information upload step since helpers do not
upload any information to the server.
Query: Queriers request information using a time range.
q ′ ⇒ S : T , where T = {t . . . t + nb}
Information download: The server does not store any information;
it forwards the search to all users, other than the querier.
S ⇒ u : T , ∀u , q
On receiving the search criteria, the helper’s smartphone
searches for matching content in its local database, finds all
the keys it obtained during the time range and computes all
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additional keys using the hash chain. The helper generates
a one-time key K to encrypt the information and then encrypts the key with all the possible hashes, and sends all the
encrypted data to the server. On receiving the message from
the server, the querier attempts to decrypt the encrypted
key after retrieving all the keys it obtained from locations it
visited during the time range T . Once it manages to decrypt
the key, it uses the key to decrypt the information.
h ⇒ S ⇒ q ′ : {E(K, I ), E(H (k), K), E(H 2 (k), K),
. . . E(H n (k), K) | ∃t ∈ T , (t, I ) ∈ h}
q ′ : K = D(H n (k), E(H n (k), K)
q ′ : I = D(K, E(K, I ))
In this version, the users need not trust the server operator
or malicious users to refrain from accessing information without
authorization. The location is never sent in clear text to the server,
so the server operator also cannot trace the helper’s or querier’s
location history. The hash keys can be reproduced, but only by
users who were at the location and obtained at least one pair of
keys.

4

DEPLOYMENT FACTORS

In this section, we discuss three factors that affect the deployment
success of an application that uses the SPICE system. For deployment to be successful, there must be a sufficient number of users
willing to share information, so that those who request context may
benefit from using the system. Also, there must be a large enough
density of Wi-Fi access points to support the mobile users, to ensure
the user devices receive cryptographic keys from at least one Wi-Fi
access point at all times. Finally, the system must be easy to deploy,
i.e., there should be minimal burden on the network administrators
to modify the network to run the SPICE protocol.
User Acceptance. Given the popularity of location-based sharing
applications (such as Piximity [17], 23Snaps [20], and Path [14])
that allow users to share information in real-time with other users
near them, we expect users might also want to retrieve data retrospectively with others who were at the same or similar locations
as them at a similar time. Researchers have explored ways to allow
users to leverage sensors and resources on nearby smartphones [4],
and using SPICE, we allow users to retrieve data retrospectively.
We also expect people might be concerned about using the SPICE
system if it discloses their location history, which we address by
adding cryptographic keys, or shares information in a manner
different from their expectations. The SPICE protocol ensures that
no location information is shared with the server or other users,
and that only the information chosen by the helper is shared with
the querier and then only in encrypted form.
Wi-Fi access points as broadcasting devices. We expect Wi-Fi access points to send keys to all nearby clients within their beacon
frames. One factor that affects SPICE success would be the density of broadcasting devices; how often can SPICE users hear a
broadcasting device? Achtzehn et al. found a 14-fold increase in
Wi-Fi density in urban residential areas over the last decade [1].
The authors revealed a Wi-Fi density of 883, 488, 5179, and 6103
APs per km 2 for the rural residential, industrial, urban retail, and
urban residential study areas in Germany, respectively; only 33

SPICE: Secure Proximity-based Infrastructure for Close Encounters
access points are required to give full data connectivity, assuming
a nominal range for standard 802.11b/g to be 100 meters [6]. Given
the high density of wireless access points, we expect that a user
will be in the vicinity of multiple access point at any location so
SPICE will be able to support its users by using access points. Of
course, there may be several locations without any Wi-Fi coverage
where users will not see even one access point. SPICE users can
still opt to share information collected at this location in a manner described in the first two versions of the protocol, i.e., either
without encryption, or by encrypting using the location reading.
Network administrators. We expect SPICE can be easily deployed.
It is easy for users to run the application on their smartphones; they
do not need to purchase any additional hardware. Also, the protocol
does not need to run in the access points; the network administrators can set up a different key server that pushes cryptographic
keys through the APs.

5

DISCUSSION

In this section, we consider several issues that may arise in realworld implementations.
Customization. The generic protocol allows helpers to collect
information from sources, and upload the details of the information
to the server, and queriers to specify the search filters and obtain
information shared, with consent, by the helpers. Developers who
use the SPICE framework in their crowd-sensing applications can
add an additional protocol layer to support different information
types and consent structures.
Metadata values. The queriers may want to use metadata values
while querying for information. For example, the metadata values
for a photograph could be keywords denoting the content of the
photograph, the type of camera the photograph was captured with,
and the resolution of the photograph. Helpers may also want to
upload metadata values to the server, so the server can match a
query to their information before contacting them with the query.
However, the metadata values may contain sensitive data, and if
sent in clear, the server operator will learn sensitive information
about the helper and querier. If the application allows users to
add metadata values to the information, the application must encrypt the metadata values with the same keys used to encrypt the
information.
Multiple APs. A user could be in the range of multiple access
points at any time. At time t, a user may be near m access points,
and may obtain 2m keys.
B 1 ⇒ h : H (k 1 ), H n−1 (k 1′ )
...
′
Bm ⇒ h : H (km ), H n−1 (km
)

The keys are stored as a series of tuples on the user’s phone, i.e.,
′ )).
(t, H (k 1 ), H n−1 (k 1′ )), (t, H (km ), H n−1 (km
To determine whether two users were in a close encounter, we
rely on the fact that if two people are spatially close, they may
observe the same or similar set of APs; SPICE uses this hypothesis
to determine whether the querier was at a location near to the
helper’s location where the information was collected. Instead of
one matching key, the application looks for subsets of matching

CrowdSenSys’17, November 5, 2017, Delft, The Netherlands
keys obtained within the same minute t, where the subset size is
equal to or greater than a threshold l specified by the application.
Phone as AP. In well-populated regions with limited network
coverage, such as remote tourist destinations, it may be possible to
use a smartphone as an access point to generate hash chains and
transmit keys. In this case, two users will be in a close encounter if
they both encountered the same third person at the same location,
at about the same time. For efficiency, smartphones can coordinate
themselves in agreeing on one immobile phone as a temporary
token generator and other moving phones as token receivers.
Hash Key Reset. If the hash chain is never reset, a malicious
user will be able to go to different locations, collect keys from
different APs, and generate all the keys in the hash chain to obtain
all the information collected by helpers. To prevent this scenario, the
hash chains must be reset periodically; the hash key reset period
is decided by the network administrator. That is, they must be
reseeded with a new random key. However, choosing the right time
for a reset may be tricky because the helper will not be able to
generate keys outside the hash chain. For example, a helper h who
collected information right before reset will not be able to share
information with a querier q who arrived at the location after the
reset. Similarly, if h collected information right after reset, she will
not be able to share information with a querier q who arrived at the
location before the reset. One option is to perform the hash reset at
a time when no helper is likely to collect information, such as 3am.
So far, we assumed in our protocols that any one who visited
the location before the hash key was reset can decrypt the helper’s
information. Even though any user can generate all the keys within
a hash chain, information encrypted by the helper should be decrypted only by queriers who were at the location within the time
period when the information was relevant, that is, near enough
and close enough to be considered a ‘close encounter’ in the semantics of this application. The time period for which information
is relevant depends on the application. In the first two versions of
the protocol, the server can easily check whether the information
collected by the helper will be relevant during the time range for
which the querier requested information and share only if the information is relevant. In the final version, the helper can determine
whether any information she collected will be relevant during the
time range for which the querier requested information and share
only if the information is relevant.
Incentives. We plan to explore credit-based incentive mechanisms to prevent helpers from uploading incorrect information,
and queriers from sharing keys for the purpose of malicious downloads and to encourage helpers to share and queriers to request
information.
Privacy concerns. We did not evaluate the prototype with real
users; users might have additional or different privacy concerns.
A full evaluation of SPICE’s usefulness and usability requires
deployment with meaningful applications. As future work, we plan
to conduct experimental evaluations using a SPICE prototype and
a thorough security analysis of the protocols.
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RELATED WORK

Delay-Tolerant Networks. SPICE is complementary to work on
opportunistic delay-tolerant networks that attempt to support peerto-peer content sharing, even when there is only sporadic connectivity between smartphones [2, 3]; our work differs in that we focus
on close encounters, which have not been explored in the field of
delay tolerant networks.
Location Proofs. There is a lot of prior work on location privacy
but we aim to solve a different problem, i.e., how to determine
whether users are in a close encounter without exposing their location history. Our work does not track or require proof of the user’s
exact location, but the SPICE system requires a user to possess or be
able to generate the keys to prove they were within spatial range of
an access point. One of the first location proof systems, proposed by
Waters et al., used round-trip signal propagation latency to prove
location [21]. Similar to SPICE, researchers have relied on a user’s
proximity to an access point [9, 10, 16, 19]; however, unlike the prior
work, SPICE requires minimal change to the existing infrastructure.
A Privacy-Preserving Location proof Updating System (APPLAUS)
allows co-located Bluetooth-enabled mobile devices to mutually
generate location proofs, and update to a location proof server [22].
Encounters. SPICE differs from prior work that addresses encounter matching in that SPICE addresses the problem of finding
people (and devices) that shared a spatially and temporally close encounter and might have never encountered each other. Our system
is similar to SMILE, which helps strangers contact each other if they
shared an encounter (and can prove to each other that they encountered one another) [11], except SPICE allows strangers to request
information from others whom they nearly encountered but did
not actually encounter, what we term a “close encounter”. Meetup
supports encounter-based social networks, where co-location is
verified by exchanging certificates that contain the user’s public
key and a photograph [12]; SPICE differs in that one of its fundamental privacy goals is to prevent the helpers and queriers from
learning each other’s identity. Finally, our work is complementary
to techniques used for proximity testing [5, 13, 18]; Narayanan et
al. propose private-equality testing of location tags to determine
if two users are close by, while our systems allow users to share
data based on common keys they would have obtained by being
spatially and temporally proximate.
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SUMMARY

We present a crowdsourcing system that extends the capabilities
of location-based applications and allows users to connect and
exchange information with other users in spatial and temporal
proximity. Our system, SPICE, addresses several privacy issues that
arise in location-based sharing, by leveraging Wi-Fi access points
to encrypt information before it is exchanged, so only users in
spatio-temporal proximity to the helper will be able to decrypt and
download the information while the server operator never learns
about the information or the users. We present the design of the
system, and describe the challenges in implementing the protocol
in a real-world application.
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